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Summary 
The theory and measurement of illicit financial flows (IFFs) is a vital challenge for the 
implementation of SDG targets. The challenge has a number of components. First, we have 
to agree on a broad definition of IFFs. We define IFFs as cross-border flows that are 
illegitimate because they are based on an abuse of power and cause harm to a society. This 
definition is deliberately broad, but we argue that it enables us to rule out significant false 
positive and false negative problems that beset the alternative definition based on legal 
violations. Moreover, our definition comes closest to the concerns motivating global 
discussions of IFFs. However, it does not automatically give us a list of all the important IFF 
flows that are relevant to policy-making. The selection of policy-relevant IFF indicators 
should meet three criteria: first, it must be possible to estimate the indicator using available 
statistics and techniques, or using feasible extensions of existing statistics; second, it must 
be possible to target the indicator using feasible policies to reduce what the indicator 
measures; and finally, the indicator must be precise enough in its measurement of damaging 
flows so that if policies succeed in reducing the value of the indicator, the result will be an 
improvement in development outcomes or prospects. Using these criteria, we need to agree 
on the most important flows that constitute policy-relevant IFFs. We argue that using our 
definition and criteria, a case can be made for the inclusion of important IFFs that are 
already in the policy discussion. However, a broad consensus needs to be constructed for 
the inclusion of particular IFFs because such a consensus does not appear to exist. Our 
definition and criteria may help in organizing that discussion and in limiting the range of IFFs 
and indicators and what exactly we mean by each of these IFFs. The most challenging task is 
to develop meaningful indicators for each selected IFF without significant false positives or 
false negatives being identified, and which satisfy the three policy-relevance conditions that 
we suggested. Here much work needs to be done, but our review of estimates shows that 
almost all the main measures that have been proposed have significant problems in terms of 
our criteria. We argue that some early exploratory work on a risk-based approach to 
measuring IFFs has been promising, though much work needs to be done to make this 
approach robust enough to achieve a broad consensus for each of the major types of IFFs of 
concern. Using this approach, we suggest a multi-level approach to identify very specific 
indicators targeting specific types of IFFs. Aggregating these indicators into a single indicator 
may have some value but is not of direct value for policy. Given the complex nature of IFFs 
targeting a composite aggregate indicator is likely to do more harm than good. The 
challenge going forward is to identify the policy-relevant IFF indicators at the micro- and 
meso-levels.   
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1. Introduction  
Illicit financial flows refer to funds that are transferred across national borders in illegitimate 
ways. The illicit or illegitimate aspect of the transferred funds could be the way in which the 
funds crossed borders, for instance by evading official mechanisms of funds transfers. But 
funds that cross borders in perfectly legitimate ways can also be deemed to be illicit if the 
sources of the funds (for instance involving crime or rule-violating activities) or the uses to 
which the funds have been put (for instance terrorism or political corruption) are illicit, or if 
tax or other laws have been violated within the country. Illicit financial flows can be a part of 
trade-related flows (related to transfer mispricing and trade misinvoicing, as well as trade in 
prohibited goods), tax-related flows (that seek to evade taxes), capital flows (illegal or 
illegitimate transfers of capital or transfers of funds that were illegally acquired) or flows 
directly related to criminal or terrorist activity. Given the range of flows that can be deemed 
to be illicit financial flows, the challenge is to define ‘illicit’ in a way that is operational, and 
yet provide a measure relevant for capturing the concerns that are at issue. In particular, the 
objective of identifying and measuring illicit financial flows is to identify a number of flows 
that are damaging for sustainable development.  
Illicit financial flows (IFFs) can obstruct sustainable development in a number of ways. The 
potential damage caused by these flows may include:  
• a reduction of private savings and investment as a result of capital flight; a reduction in 
tax collection due to tax evasion or avoidance;  
• the emergence of speculative asset bubbles as owners of illicit funds invest in specific 
assets perceived to be safe havens;  
• unfair competition when smuggling practices destroy domestic industries and domestic 
employment;  
• and damage to investor confidence when laws are not enforced or not aligned with 
legitimate social interests as a result of the influence of illicit financial interests.  
Illicit flows can also make the enforcement of developmental policies more difficult because 
of the difficulty of disciplining illicit financial interests, they can lead to increased financing of 
criminal, terrorist and other damaging activities and they can distort politics by allowing 
hidden interests to influence policy-making in damaging ways. Identifying, measuring and 
targeting illicit flows can therefore be important for achieving sustainable development 
goals. However, to be effective, we have to identify and measure the flows that cause 
particular problems. This requires an identification of illicit flows relevant for a particular 
country and the identification of appropriate indicators so that the success of strategies 
targeting these flows can be tracked.  
Given the many different types of potential illicit flows and the different processes through 
which these resources may be transmitted across borders, the definition of IFFs is not 
straightforward. A very wide range of cross-border financial flows have been deemed to be 
illicit, and the identification and measurement of the ones that are most relevant for policy 
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in particular contexts is a challenge. An inaccurate definition may result in targeting flows 
that policy cannot feasibly reduce over the medium-term, or more seriously, result in the 
targeting of flows whose reduction may actually cause harm. We will argue that the search 
for a simple definition of IFFs that can be used across all countries and all types of problems 
may be implausible given the multiplicity of problems and processes, suggesting that 
different types of IFFs may be more relevant in different countries and contexts. Therefore, 
we argue that the challenge is to achieve a consensus to identify and define a limited set of 
financial flows as illicit on the grounds that they clearly appear to be damaging on the basis 
of available theory and evidence, and which can be feasibly targeted by policy to improve 
development outcomes in the widest range of contexts.  
We do not have sufficient evidence at this stage to reach a consensus on a comprehensive 
list of the most useful indicators for different contexts, let alone a single indicator that will 
suffice to measure IFFs across all countries. Instead, given the complexity of illicit flows, and 
the limits of our understanding, a reasonable strategy would be to develop a multi-level 
indicator system composed of indicators targeting specific illicit flows, and to test their 
usefulness for policy in different contexts. As our understanding of the usefulness of these 
indicators improves, we will be able to achieve a better consensus about which indicators 
that are most appropriate for particular types of contexts, countries or problems, and even 
to construct a composite indicator. We have considerable knowledge about the strengths 
and weaknesses of existing indicators, and we can select some of these indicators, or 
develop and strengthen them on the basis of their known weaknesses.  
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2. Measurement challenges and 
criteria 
We believe the purpose of defining IFFs and identifying appropriate indicators is to assist 
policy that seeks to target IFFs as a way of accelerating or sustaining development. The most 
theoretically appealing definitions and measures may not be the most appropriate in typical 
policy contexts if these indicators are difficult to calculate, if they capture a range of flows 
that in some contexts may have uncertain effects on development outcomes, or if the 
measures are unlikely to be responsive to feasible policies. Our primary goal must be to 
minimize the chances of measurement errors, ensure that targeting the reduction of the 
selected measures is feasible, and that targeting these measures will help development and 
will not inadvertently achieve adverse outcomes. As we know from our experience with the 
Millennium Development Goals, the provision of indicators has a direct effect on policy 
(Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2015). As soon as an IFF is defined and the 
indicators for measuring it identified, these will become targets for policy in countries that 
select the IFF target as one of their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These countries 
will design policies to reduce the measure of IFF according to the agreed indicators, and they 
will track their progress by looking at how the targeted indicator evolves over time in 
response to their policies. Choosing the right indicator therefore has to be judged in terms of 
this policy process.  
As the SDG target is to reduce illicit financial flows, the indicators identified for measuring 
IFFs must measure illicit flows that are damaging for society, that are feasible to reduce, and 
whose reduction by policy will contribute positively to development. This may be stating the 
obvious, but it is important to remind ourselves why we are trying to define and measure 
IFFs, and that our efforts are part of the SDG process. From the SDG perspective, we believe 
any indicator measuring IFFs has to satisfy at least the following critical conditions: 
a)  It must be possible to estimate the indicator using available statistics and techniques, or 
using feasible extensions of existing statistics; and 
b)  It must be possible to target the indicator using feasible policies to reduce what the 
indicator measures; and 
c)  The indicator must be precise enough in its measurement of damaging flows so that if 
policies succeed in reducing the value of the indicator, the result will be an improvement 
in development outcomes or prospects. 
Meeting all three conditions (to the best degree possible) is essential to ensure that if a 
country measures IFFs using the selected indicators and succeeds in reducing them, the 
country will be better off as a result. It is important for an indicator to meet all three 
conditions to some extent, but the last one is particularly important because it is the one 
that is easiest to overlook. Indicators that inadvertently include many flows that are actually 
not damaging (the problem of false positives) or that exclude many flows that are damaging 
(the problem of false negatives) will provide measures that are weakly correlated with 
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development or not at all correlated. Targeting such indicators may not result in 
improvements in welfare. Even worse, if the false positives are flows that cannot be reduced 
without inflicting damage, targeting such an indicator may actually have adverse 
consequences. Such a measurement and tracking exercise would soon be legitimately 
criticized and could discredit the IFF SDG target as a whole. Unfortunately, finding indicators 
that actually meet these conditions is not easy. Indicators that meet one of these conditions 
may fail in terms of one or both of the others. For instance, an indicator that in theory 
measures flows that are unequivocally damaging for development may not be useful if the 
indicator is difficult to measure or if it identifies flows that are difficult or impossible to 
target with feasible policies. No indicator is likely to meet all of these conditions fully. In 
practice, therefore, we need to look for the best compromise indicators that satisfy all of 
these conditions to the greatest possible extent. It may also be that attempting to directly 
measure what are often hidden flows is fraught with too many potential measurement 
errors and a better strategy may be to identify ‘risk factors’ that measure the likelihood of 
particular flows being significant in specific contexts, as a way of indirectly estimating their 
magnitude and severity (Turkewitz, et al. 2018). 
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3. ‘Illegal’ versus ‘Illegitimate and 
Damaging for Sustainable 
Development’ 
3.1. ‘Illegal’ financial flows 
Given the range of flows that could potentially be defined as illicit, it could be argued that a 
feasible definition of IFFs should simplify the problem by equating illicit flows with flows that 
are illegal. This definition would include in its remit funds that cross borders that are earned, 
used or transferred in ways that break specific laws, including tax laws. The merit of this 
definition is that it would at least allow us to identify IFFs relatively easily without having to 
make subjective judgements, and this could be the justification for making it the benchmark 
for policy (Forstater 2018; Turkewitz et al. 2018). However, while this definition does provide 
a definition of what is an illicit flow without reference to tests other than legality, there are 
significant problems from the perspective of our third criterion listed above. Will the 
indicators derived from this definition help to identify flows whose reduction will contribute 
(with a high level of confidence) to better development outcomes?  
Consider the definition of IFFs as flows that break specific laws governing the earning, use or 
transfer of funds. This definition can generate a large number of false positives and false 
negatives from the perspective of sustainable development, and some of the false positives 
are particularly serious in that attempting to reduce them may have adverse consequences. 
A false positive is an identification of a flow as illicit according to a particular definition, 
which may actually not be damaging for sustaining development. For instance, there are 
many circumstances, particularly in developing countries, where some laws may be 
confusing or contradictory, and sometimes unworkable. Moreover, and partly related to 
this, the general level of adherence to laws is also often unavoidably low in many developing 
countries, which typically manifests itself in high levels of informality. In these contexts, a 
wide range of financial transactions may appear to have by-passed existing laws, even if they 
are everyday transactions in that context, and not necessarily the transactions that we want 
to target. Many businesses in developing countries, particularly smaller ones, may not be 
able to provide accounts for all their financial flows through appropriate book-keeping 
practices because of large elements of informality in many of their transactions. Similarly, 
many regulations may be difficult to adhere to if the regulations are themselves 
inappropriate. In these contexts, many cross-border transfers may involve funds that have 
inadvertently or unavoidably evaded some laws at some stage of their generation, use or 
transmission. In a more serious case of a false positive, the state may be captured by groups 
who may define laws in ways that seek to expropriate specific ethnic, political or business 
groups. Here the enforcement of discriminatory or predatory laws is morally questionable 
and moreover, the unjust expropriation of some groups is likely to positively damage 
development (Epstein 2005). This is why we would not normally consider capital fleeing 
from legal but unjust expropriation as an illicit capital flow. The examples discussed above 
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are only illustrative, but a wide range of flows of these types are not exceptional in the 
global context of cross-border flows. Of course, many illegal transfers will have deliberately 
violated useful laws and are genuinely socially harmful. Distinguishing between these cases 
of legal violations is critical if policy is to target the relevant flows.  
Thus, all financial flows that involve some element of illegality are not necessarily 
unequivocally damaging for achieving SDGs in these developing country contexts. Moreover, 
targeting some of the false positives may have adverse outcomes. For instance, identifying 
flows related to the large informal sectors in developing countries as illicit is not likely to 
lead to a rapid formalization of these economies, making most of their financial flows legal. 
There is no quick way in which developing countries can achieve a rule of law and a 
regulatory structure that legitimate businesses can comply with and constrain their 
governments so that they cannot extract from specific groups or the entire society. If we do 
not believe this is rapidly achievable, then a definition of illicitness based on legality will 
identify a very wide range of persistent false positives, making it difficult to identify the flows 
that we really want to target. Even worse, the only immediate way of reducing the value of 
an indicator that includes these false positives would be to cut down cross-border 
transactions passing through the informal sector, which may have the perverse effect of 
constraining development in these contexts.  
The legality-based definition can also generate false negatives. This means it can exclude a 
range of financial flows that we may wish to describe as illicit flows. For instance, some 
financial flows such as those involving tax avoidance or transfer pricing may be damaging to 
a country, particularly a developing country, even if they are entirely legal. The term illicit 
financial flow often refers to these types of flows in everyday usage, and also in the usage of 
a number of analysts engaged in policy research on illicit financial flows (UNECA 2018). 
There may also be a potential false negative problem if regimes in power in some countries 
use their control over legal processes to legally remit funds abroad that they have legally 
(but illegitimately) expropriated from particular business, political or ethnic groups. These 
transfers would be considered illicit in the discourse on illicit flows but would be excluded by 
a purely legal definition of IFFs.  
For these reasons, a definition of illicit flows simply in terms of what is legal may not be 
appropriate in many contexts. Figure 1 summarizes the problem of false positives and false 
negatives that emerges from the legal definition of illicit financial flows. We believe that the 
false positives and false negatives that flow from this definition are sufficiently important 
(particularly the problem of false positives in the context of informality and the absence of a 
rule of law in many countries) that should preclude the use of this definition as the 
benchmark for identifying IFFs.  
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Figure 1: Implications of defining IFFs in terms of legality 
 
Source: Authors 
3.2. ‘Illegitimate and damaging for Sustainable 
Development’ financial flows 
An alternative definition of IFFs can potentially address these problems of false positives and 
negatives. According to this definition, IFFs are cross-border financial flows that are 
illegitimate (irrespective of whether they are legal or not) because they benefit particular 
groups who abuse their power to engage in transactions that damage society (Blankenburg 
and Khan 2012). One of the two stipulations, namely that power has been abused and that 
society has been damaged, can be considered to be redundant. This is because if power has 
been exercised in enabling a transaction but society was not thereby harmed, it would be 
hard to say that power had been abused. Similarly, if society has been harmed by a 
transaction that benefited a group with the power to carry out this transaction, it would not 
be remiss to define this as a misuse of power. However, both parts of the definition are 
important to rule out transactions where social damage happens as a result of accidental or 
mistaken transactions that were not deliberate. The latter should not be counted as IFFs. 
This definition is harder to operationalize compared to the definition based on the violation 
of law, because there may indeed be a range of opinions about what constitutes damage to 
society or the abuse of power. But if we accept that this definition is closer to capturing the 
problem that motivated the discussion of illicit financial flows in the first place, we can ask 
whether the range of what is covered can be practically delimited to achieve a consensus on 
specific flows that satisfy this criterion. If the discourse on illicit flows had been primarily 
interested in illegal flows, the discussion would have referred to the relevant flows as illegal 
financial flows. The choice of the term ‘illicit’ was deliberate and tells us that the participants 
in this discussion were, and are, interested in flows that are socially undesirable in some 
sense, involve an abuse of power, and are therefore illegitimate, and not just illegal. The two 
approaches identify a different list of flows, and a relevant question to examine is whether 
the false positives and false negatives that derive from the legal definition are significant 
enough from the perspective of the SDGs for us to abandon or significantly modify that 
definition. We believe the anomalies that arise are serious enough for us to look beyond the 
legal definition.  
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The second definition of IFFs directly addresses the illegitimate financial flows that actually 
constrain the achievement of SDGs. This definition allows us to include in our remit some 
financial transactions that violate norms of legitimacy and obstruct the achievement of SDGs 
regardless of whether these flows are legal or illegal in particular jurisdictions. This definition 
is more closely aligned with what we mean by illicit financial flows in everyday discourse. 
This definition is different from the first in that it explicitly seeks to exclude the false 
positives (extra-legal transactions that may not be illegitimate if there is no way for 
legitimate businesses to abide by the law and add value for society) and to include some of 
the false negatives (legal transactions that may be harmful and therefore illegitimate) that 
were identified in Figure 1. However, while this definition may be closer to the everyday 
discourse on IFFs, at first sight it is difficult to operationalize, and the relevant indicators 
more difficult to identify. This is clear when we consider the complex range of financial flows 
that we need to include and exclude from the list of illegal flows to identify the illegitimate 
financial flows that actually constrain the achievement of SDGs.  
There are a number of potential objections to this alternative definition of IFFs. Some of 
these concerns are valid but they can be addressed, particularly given the serious 
disadvantages of the alternative. One possible objection is that a definition of IFFs as flows 
that are illegitimate involves observers making subjective judgements about social damage 
and the abuse of power to identify the relevant damaging flows. This makes the definition 
hard to operationalize relative to a definition based on legal violations to identify the 
relevant flows (Turkewitz, et al. 2018). This is an important argument because it is clear that 
there is indeed no simple criterion that can be used to identify all the illegitimate flows that 
are damaging for the SDGs, or for society in a more general sense. The criterion of social 
damage cannot be applied to every cross-border flow to identify the ones that are 
problematic in a way that all observers would agree on. Moreover, the social damage 
inflicted by the financial flow would have to be illegitimate, in the sense that it benefited a 
specific group that was abusing its power, because we would not want to count as IFFs flows 
that were damaging because the national or world economy was in crisis, or because there 
were policy mistakes from the perspective of the observer.  
Apart from the argument of subjectivity and operational difficulties, Maya Forstater (2018) 
argues that IFFs should only refer to illegal cross-border transfers because otherwise we risk 
undermining the respect for a rule of law. This is an important argument, but it confuses the 
enforcement of law with the achievement of a rule of law. A rule of law describes a system 
where all individuals and organizations are subject to the law, including lawmakers and law-
enforcing agencies, which limits the possibility of powerful groups misusing the law for their 
own interest. The achievement of a rule of law is a long historical process and most 
developing and emerging countries are some way from getting there. The rule of law can 
occasionally be under threat in advanced countries too. What most countries have is rule by 
law, and in these contexts, who makes the law, and how constrained they are by law 
themselves, determines the content and legitimacy of the law (Khan 2018). This is why the 
enforcement of a law that targets and seeks to expropriate specific businesses or political 
parties or ethnicities is not necessarily a rule of law; and why the imposition of such laws can 
be both illegitimate and socially damaging rather than the reverse. We agree that moving 
towards a rule of law is a desirable objective for all countries, but enforcing every existing 
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law in every jurisdiction, or blocking financial flows that violate any such laws, may not be 
the most propitious way of advancing that cause. The alternative definition takes these 
challenges into account and argues that the objective of identifying and measuring IFFs is to 
identify and track the illegitimate financial flows that are directly affecting the achievement 
of SDGs in countries that may be at quite different stages of achieving a rule of law 
(Blankenburg and Khan 2012).  
A secondary argument that Forstater makes is that if we are concerned with tax avoidance 
and transfer pricing, we should look at transfer pricing problems under SDG 17.1 (domestic 
resource mobilization) and not SDG 16.4 (illicit flows). However, tax avoidance and transfer 
pricing are examples of financial flows that, though they may sometimes be legal, are 
nevertheless identified as IFFs by some analysts. These flows could therefore be 
incorporated in our second definition but would definitely be excluded by the strictly legal 
definition. Whether we wish to include transfer pricing and tax avoidance even in our 
second definition is a separate question. We do not necessarily take a strong position on 
this. Whether we include tax avoidance and transfer pricing problems in our list of IFFs that 
constrain the achievement of SDGs in Figure 1 is a matter of achieving international 
consensus on this issue.  
Using the second definition does not mean that we need to exhaustively identify the full 
range of flows that satisfy the definition. Rather, it provides the criterion that any flow 
included in our policy-relevant list should satisfy, but the actual list will necessarily be 
selective and determined through a process of discussion to reach the widest possible 
consensus on the inclusion of particular flows. Adopting the second definition does not 
require us to agree on the inclusion of any specific financial flow in our list of relevant IFFs. 
The list of flows that we should include in our agreed list of IFFs will depend on the degree of 
consensus supporting the inclusion of this particular flow. The three conditions that we 
referred to earlier to ensure policy relevance will further narrow the selection of the agreed 
list of flows. However, the second definition will also exclude some flows on the grounds 
that these flows do not necessarily cause avoidable social damage and immediately blocking 
these flows may itself inadvertently cause social damage.  
On these grounds, we could argue that there is a case for including transfer pricing and tax 
avoidance in our definition of IFFs. However, the specific indicators used to measure and 
track these flows have to be plausible, they should measure flows that are the outcome of 
misuses of power and they should satisfy the other conditions discussed earlier. Otherwise, 
including measures of tax avoidance that have too many false positives may weaken support 
for including this category in the list of IFFs under the second definition. Note that using the 
second definition does not rule out the problem of false positives and false negatives. We 
still have to be careful in identifying the appropriate IFFs and indicators so that we are not 
picking up financial flows that we do not want to pick up, or excluding the ones that we do. 
We will see examples of these problems when we discuss specific IFFs and indicators below.  
Thus, we believe there is a way of operationalizing the second definition, keeping in mind 
the objectives of measuring IFFs identified earlier, and the three conditions that we believe 
indicators of IFFs should satisfy. Instead of thinking of the second definition as an algorithm 
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that anyone can use to identify the full range of IFFs, we should instead think of it as a guide 
for a discussion to seek a broad consensus about a number of specific flows that we wish to 
track and control in line with the SDG target. To operationalize this approach we therefore 
need to specify a number of important types of financial flows that are likely to be damaging 
for SDGs in a variety of contexts. This will help to identify a list of important financial flows 
that comply with the second definition, and approximate some of the most important flows 
that would be included in the box labelled ‘genuine IFFs constraining SDGs’ in Figure 1.  
The aim is not to identify an exhaustive list of all the financial flows that are illicit in terms of 
this definition because it is not likely that we will achieve consensus on such a list. The criticism 
that this definition involves making subjective judgements is therefore clearly correct. We do 
need to achieve a broad consensus on a list of flows and indicators that satisfy the definition 
and the conditions for policy relevance. The agreed upon list may therefore turn out to include 
only illegal flows (as suggested by Turkewitz et al.) provided they satisfy the condition of 
causing avoidable and therefore illegitimate social damage, and they may exclude transfer 
pricing and tax avoidance (as suggested by Forstater). However, they would not include all 
cross-border transactions that fail the legality test, because this would result in too many false 
positives to make the measure useful. At the minimum, reducing the problem of excessive 
false positives is the significant contribution of the second definition, and may save the IFF 
tracking project from becoming unworkable in developing countries. Moreover, if we move 
beyond their argument for a purely legal definition of IFFs, the risk factor approach suggested 
by Turkewitz et al. (2018) may provide a useful way of operationalizing tracking the IFFs that 
we agree satisfy the conditions for SDG policy-relevance.  
It is important to point out that while the second definition involves making explicit 
subjective judgements and reaching consensus on these judgements, the alternative legal 
definition also makes an implicit subjective judgement of great significance. This is that an 
adherence to existing laws is a necessary and sufficient condition for achieving the social 
good, and any non-adherence to law, regardless of context or feasibility, constitutes an illicit 
act that the international community should target. We do not believe that this judgement 
will actually achieve broad acceptance because of the very significant false positives and 
false negatives that we have discussed. The problems of weak governance and a poor rule of 
law in developing countries are widely recognized in the literature. In fact, the subjectivity 
problem in the illegitimacy definition is actually easier to address, by defining the problem as 
one of achieving a broad consensus on a finite list of flows that satisfy a broadly defined set 
of criteria and conditions.  
To conclude, we believe that it is possible to make the illegitimacy definition practical. To do 
that, we would need to identify a list of flows that most observers would agree were 
damaging for development and sustained by an abuse of power, and these are exactly the 
types of flows that are described as IFFs in the popular discourse. Our list may include flows 
that are not entirely illegal, and may exclude some flows that are. If a broad consensus 
cannot be achieved for the inclusion of a particular flow, then even if some observers think 
the flow is illegitimate and damaging, we will have to drop that flow from the consensus list. 
We argue that this process of discussion and seeking consensus is essential to identify a list 
of policy-relevant flows and indicators that should be included in our measure of IFFs.  
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4. Parallels with corruption analysis  
Some of the problems that have emerged in the discussion of illicit financial flows have close 
parallels with problems that have emerged in the analysis of corruption. Corruption has 
sometimes been defined in a ‘narrow’ legalistic way, as the violation of formal rules by those 
in public authority to further their economic or political interests. According to this 
definition, corruption involves public officials breaking the law for personal gain, typically 
involving bribery. Just as with illicit financial flows, when corruption is defined in terms of 
illegality, many types of activities that would be described as corruption in everyday usage 
are excluded.  
To include these cases, the definition of corruption has moved away from a narrow legalistic 
one to align more closely with issues of public concern. Corruption may not involve the 
breaking of laws if laws prohibiting the misuse of power in specific ways do not exist, or if 
bureaucrats or politicians use the discretion that they are legally allowed in partisan ways. In 
extreme cases of state capture, politicians or bureaucrats may define laws in ways that give 
them the right to capture resources in legal but illegitimate ways. In all these cases, a narrow 
definition of corruption as violations of laws by those in positions of power may be too 
restrictive. As a result, corruption is now normally understood to be ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’ (https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption). Variants of this 
definition have been adopted by most international organizations including the World Bank 
(Bhargava 2005). The notable feature of this definition is that it no longer relies exclusively 
on violations of law to define corruption, and brings in the abuse of power as a critical 
determinant of corrupt activities. Moreover, the broader definition of corruption does not 
require the involvement of public officials. Individuals in the corporate sector enjoying 
‘entrusted power’ could also engage in abuses of power that would be classified as 
corruption.  
The broader definitions of corruption and of IFFs thus have important overlaps. Both refer to 
transactions that are illegitimate because they involve the abuse of power. Illicit financial 
flows refer exclusively to transactions that cross international borders, while corruption 
refers to transactions that are generally within a national jurisdiction. Corruption still refers 
primarily to activities that involve someone in public authority, like a politician or a 
bureaucrat, even though the broader definition of corruption as violations of entrusted 
power can include corruption by the corporate sector that does not involve public officials.  
The discussion of IFFs sometimes includes corruption as a separate category of cross-border 
financial flows. However, this is likely to result in unnecessary double counting. When the 
receipts of corruption cross international borders, whether they are bribes, or the excess 
profits of companies that engage in corruption, these flows would be identified as IFFs in any 
case. If we use a legal definition of both corruption and illicit financial flows, then bribery 
incomes that cross international borders would be classified as IFFs automatically. Similarly, 
if we use a broader social legitimacy-based definition of corruption and IFFs, then any 
corrupt incomes of public or private sector entities, based on the abuse of power and 
crossing international borders would be automatically classified as IFFs. This is why, 
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irrespective of the definition of corruption and IFFs, the cross-border movements of incomes 
generated by corruption would automatically be illicit financial flows. It is not necessary to 
include bribery or corruption as a separate category of IFFs, and doing so would risk double 
counting.  
Given the close overlaps between corruption and IFFs, the analysis of IFFs can benefit from 
the considerable policy experience and analysis that has developed for anti-corruption 
strategies. An important lesson is that IFFs (like corruption) describe a very wide range of 
transactions. Transactions that involve corruption can range from petty corruption that can 
have limited effects on overall economic performance, to types of corruption that can 
significantly distort policy and divert very significant resources away from productive uses 
(Khan 2002, 2006). The multiplicity of types of corruption, each driven by different sets of 
factors, has meant that measures of corruption matter a great deal. Ignoring these 
differences means that aggregate measures of corruption are likely to ‘add up’ many 
different types of corruption that have different causes and effects. Targeting such an 
aggregate measure can be quite problematic. Attempting to devise a policy that 
simultaneously targets all types of corruption and is thereby likely to make a dent on the 
aggregate measure is very likely to fail.  
Similarly, IFFs can describe very different flows with very different underlying drivers. Some 
of the drivers of corruption and IFFs may be hard to change by immediate policy, and 
targeting these types of IFFs (or corruption) may not deliver immediate results. Indeed, the 
attempt to target forms of corruption that are structural and cannot be immediately 
reduced can occasionally do damage. For instance, some types of corruption can emerge as 
a result of the insufficient development of a rule of law in developing countries and the 
prevalence of clientelist politics (Khan 2005). In these contexts, anti-corruption has to be 
carefully targeted if it is to be effective, because many activities may be inadvertently 
tainted with corruption. Anti-corruption strategies that target aggregate measures either do 
not work (there are too many different things being targeted) or inadvertently have negative 
effects because some types of corruption cannot be feasibly reduced and attempts to 
reduce these types of corruption can squeeze economic activities without achieving the 
significant structural changes that promote a rule of law or reduce these types of corruption. 
A general anti-corruption strategy may therefore achieve very little in these contexts, as we 
know from the disappointing achievements of general anti-corruption strategies in many 
developing countries (DFID 2015; Johnsøn, et al. 2012). A similar caution should apply to 
strategies to address IFFs. Just like corruption, there are many types of IFFs, with different 
drivers. A strategy targeting IFFs is only likely to deliver results if it targets specific IFFs that 
are amenable to feasible policy interventions and uses appropriate indicators to measure 
progress in reducing these specific IFFs.  
If policies target very broad measures of IFFs the results can be adverse, just as they can be 
by targeting broad measures of corruption. This is again for similar reasons: the policy target 
can then include flows that may have structural drivers that cannot be changed in the short 
to medium term, without harming the economy or social welfare. Consider a measure of 
IFFs that includes: outflows that are the result of illegal tax evasion; notional tax losses that 
arise as a result of tax concessions granted by a developing country to attract foreign 
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investment; criminal activity; poor rule of law conditions that result in inadvertent legal 
violations by some businesses; and capital outflows due to high political expropriation risk. A 
composite measure that does not discriminate between these flows is actually a bad 
measures of illicit flows from a policy perspective, because policies targeting such a measure 
could easily make some societies worse off. For instance, the composite indicator may 
include some flows that are difficult to target, like the proceeds of crime, or the flows that 
are tainted because of a general weakness of the rule of law. It may also include some flows 
that are easier to target like tax avoidance. But, paradoxically, the easy to address flows may 
not be the most damaging flows, and some tax concessions may be deliberately offered by 
some developing countries to attract foreign investment that would otherwise have been 
disincentivised by adverse conditions, including a weak rule of law, weak infrastructure or 
political risks. Choking off these concessions may reduce the measure of IFF, but it may also 
have the unfortunate effect of reducing investment and thereby social welfare in that 
country.  
Our work on feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies in the Anti-Corruption 
Evidence Research Consortium at SOAS University of London (SOAS-ACE - 
https://ace.soas.ac.uk) is based on avoiding some of the failures that have beset generalized 
anti-corruption strategies that developing countries and the international community have 
often tried to implement in very adverse contexts. The SOAS-ACE research on anti-
corruption shows that anti-corruption has to be designed to target very specific types of 
corruption that operate very differently across sectors and countries. It is very likely that the 
same considerations will affect strategies targeting IFFs. Given the many different types of 
IFFs, the relevant IFFs may also be different across countries with different characteristics. 
The immediate challenge is to agree on a list of IFFs that satisfy an agreed definition and 
policy-relevance tests (we suggested three critical conditions that indicators of IFFs must 
meet). The second challenge is to field-test indicators and measures of these IFFs so that we 
are assured that our measures are not misleading or damaging and are actually useful for 
monitoring the progress of anti-IFF policies in a variety of contexts. An even later statistical 
challenge will be to agree about how best to aggregate a number of different measures of 
each type of critical IFFs (for instance capital outflows affecting domestic investment, profit 
shifting that reduces tax collection, flows associated with drugs, human trafficking or 
terrorism) into an aggregate measure that is still useful. However, we should not jump into 
the aggregation problem without first going through all the prior steps, which clearly still 
need to be taken. In the next few sections we discuss a number of potentially important 
components of IFFs and evaluate the indicators available for measuring them. 
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5. Multi-nationals and tax evasion: 
What would a feasible IFF indicator 
look like? 
This section looks at illicit financial flows arising from tax evasion, tax avoidance and 
regulatory distortion. Recalling our earlier discussion of false negatives, a legal definition of 
IFFs would exclude tax avoidance as an IFF. For the moment, we include tax avoidance issues 
as a potential IFF as we will follow our second definition of IFFs as illegitimate flows, and 
because there is a considerable body of policy literature that includes these flows as illicit. 
Including tax avoidance as an illicit flow has been justified on grounds of tax justice and the 
importance of taxation as a source of revenue for funding public goods and development. 
The need to enforce ‘arm’s length’ taxation and clamp down on profit shifting has resulted in 
intensive efforts at a multilateral level, especially with regard to corporate tax evasion and 
avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs). Recent efforts by the OECD have also 
identified profit misalignment as a problem that can arise due to illegal evasion, illegitimate 
avoidance and lawful avoidance (Cobham and Jansky 2017). However, Cobham and Jansky 
point out that abiding by the new OECD goals set out in 2013 will not help to eradicate the 
full range of profit misalignment problems because that is not the OECD goal. According to 
them, the OECD goals are predicated on the suggestion that MNC parents and subsidiaries 
should be treated as independent profit making entities and they recommend market-based 
transfer prices for assessing transactions between parents and affiliates. Cobham and Jansky 
rightly question the logic of this as MNCs exist to internalise ownership advantages and 
hence cannot credibly be asked to use notional market prices for internal transfers. The 
alternative, they suggest, is to allocate profits and taxes between affiliates based on their 
real economic activity in each country. The aim is therefore not to track tax evading or 
avoiding behaviour directly, but to track the scale of profit shifting using the misalignment 
between profits and economic activity across the countries (particularly developing 
countries) where the MNC is operating. 
The reason for focusing on MNC activities in developing countries is mainly because the tax 
base in developing countries is very thin, especially for income taxes, and taxation of 
corporate profits is often the main source of direct tax revenue (UNECA 2018). Shifting 
profits for tax avoidance in this context can have adverse consequences for development. 
The report of the high level panel on illicit flows from Africa, quoted in UNECA (2018) 
estimated that African countries were losing USD 50 billion annually due to illicit flows and 
that between 2000 and 2015 net illicit outflows between Africa and the rest of the world 
averaged USD 73 billion annually (UNECA 2018). The two main ways in which MNCs dodge 
taxes are debt restructuring and transfer pricing. In the first case, MNCs lend heavily from 
tax havens to affiliates in higher tax jurisdictions. The interest deduction on the debt in the 
poorer country significantly reduces tax incidence. Developing countries tend to lack rules 
disallowing thin capitalisation and this allows them to stack up debt more easily. The second 
route is through transfer mispricing (Centre for Applied Research, et al. 2015). 
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Estimates provided across a range of studies show how profit shifting to low tax jurisdictions 
like tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions help MNCs lower their tax liability very significantly. 
The fact that higher statutory tax rates lead to higher debt equity ratios has been studied in 
the literature, especially for the US and Germany (Desai, et al. 2004; Mintz and 
Weichenrieder 2005; Buettner, et al. 2006). Huizinga et al. (2006) also showed that 
European MNCs followed strategies using differences in tax rates and systems across 
countries to reduce their liabilities. Dischinger et al. (2010) showed that companies with 
subsidiaries which had an overall high firm-specific risk were more prone to use debt shifting 
than the subsidiaries with lower firm-specific risk, using German firms with high R&D risks as 
an exogenous proxy variable for risk. Other work focusing on IFFs and transfer pricing 
include Fuest and Riedel (2012), Reynolds and Weir (2016) and Johannesen and Larsen 
(2016). Later empirical work has focused on specific estimates using dollar values.  
A number of studies have used the idea that reporting of income is sensitive to changes, and 
differences, in tax rates—essentially measuring the elasticity of reporting. A recent review 
article on the literature on elasticities by Dharmapala (2014) suggests that based on studies 
of semi-elasticity the magnitude of profit shifting may not be as high as the prevailing policy 
discourse suggests. However, he does question whether the methodology is failing to pick 
up potentially large infra-marginal profit shifting. On the other hand, estimates by 
accountants and most recently by De Simone and colleagues (2016) suggests income shifting 
might be larger in magnitude than the current policy discourse suggests. MNCs not only shift 
profits across jurisdictions to take advantage of differences in tax rates, they also shift profits 
from higher profit to lower-profit or loss-making affiliates as a way of reducing overall tax 
liabilities. When including loss-making affiliates in their study, the tax elasticity, or income 
shifted due to a change in tax incentives nearly doubled. The scale of the problem may be 
inferred from the Financial Times chart below which shows the difference between the 
effective tax rates reported by MNCs at their headquarters and the actual tax paid. The 
difference plausibly reflects the tax these MNCs have saved by shifting profits to reduce 
liabilities. The reduction in tax liabilities not only affects developing countries, but also 
advanced countries and China where most of these MNCs are headquartered. This literature 
suggests that the profit shifting problem includes shifting profits across profitable and loss-
making affiliates as well as across high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions.  
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Figure 2: Gap between reported effective tax rates and tax actually paid 
 
Source: Financial Times (https://www.ft.com/content/2b356956-17fc-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44) (Toplensky 2018) 
It may be objected that a company with many affiliates should be allowed to do tax planning 
to reduce its liabilities, and this is indeed the case. However, the argument would be that 
cross-border tax planning that shifts profits across national borders is illegitimate and harms 
at least one of the countries in a way that it did not agree to when setting its tax codes.  
Most of the work based on elasticity does not provide estimates and dollar values of 
revenue losses, but some more recent literature reviewed below does. UNCTAD (2015) 
estimates that profit shifting from developing countries leads to losses of USD 91 billion 
annually. Their approach looks at data on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and estimates tax 
revenue losses associated with inward FDI that is linked to tax havens. The estimates look at 
the relationship between relative rates of return and offshore investments. They find that 
corporates based in tax havens pay substantially less tax than those based in other 
jurisdictions. However Cobham and Jansky (2017) correctly point out the reasons why these 
estimates might be capturing not only corporate profit shifting but also avoidance of capital 
gains taxation or withholding tax as well as treaty shopping. Another study at the IMF by 
Crivelli et al (2015) establishes a causal link between the average of corporate tax rates in 
tax havens and the incidence of base spillovers. The intuition here is that the estimated 
losses due to profit shifting point to how much revenue a country would gain if the tax rates 
in the tax havens could be brought into line with that of the home country. Cobham and 
Jansky’s robustness test points to the fact that lower income countries lose relatively more 
taxes. A similar effort by the OECD (Johansson et al 2017) estimates revenue losses from 
profit shifting at USD 100 to 240 billion annually, representing between 4 to 10 percent of 
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global corporate income tax revenues (CIT). The OECD’s estimates are broader than the 
UNCTAD’s or the IMF’s in terms of the effects they try to capture: profit shifting due to tax 
differentials across jurisdictions and differences in average effective tax rates between large 
subsidiaries due to differences in tax systems and preferences. In the first instance, losses 
from profit shifting amount to USD 99 billion and losses due to differences in average 
effective tax rates to USD 50 billion. However the Orbis database the work draws on 
underrepresents both secrecy jurisdictions and lower income countries and hence the true 
scale and nature of profit shifting sensitivity cannot be fully established on this basis 
(Cobham and Jansky 2017). The OECD study also uses financial accounts rather than tax 
returns, making the data relatively less robust as tax returns may sometimes show that 
actual taxes paid were even lower than the financial accounts estimated. 
A study by Clausing (2016) deploys a two-step approach to estimate profit shifting by US 
MNCs using statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. She estimates the semi-
elasticity of reported income with respect to tax rate differentials across countries for US 
firms to estimate the profits that may have been declared by subsidiaries of US MNCs if the 
differential in tax rates between the US and the countries the subsidiaries operated in 
disappeared. She then adjusts for various parameters like foreign MNCs profit shifting from 
the US and intra-firm transactions between US MNCs and their affiliates relative to intra-firm 
transactions between foreign parents and their affiliates, to arrive at estimates for US losses 
from profit shifting. In a second step she extends her US estimates to most of the global 
economy using the Forbes 2000 Global database of the largest corporations. Here she 
assumes that the share of income booked by these global MNCs in low tax countries (she 
identifies 17 countries with an effective rate lower than 15 percent) is proportionate to the 
share of income reported by US MNCs in these low tax jurisdictions. She then applies the 
same semi-elasticity estimate to calculate what profits would be in low tax countries and the 
magnitude of the shift to these jurisdictions. Her estimates suggest that around USD 545 
billion of profits of US companies and around USD 1,076 billion of profits for MNCs from 
other countries were booked in low tax countries because of the tax differential. While her 
work on the US is more robust, her scaling up and extrapolation to MNCs headquartered 
elsewhere should be taken as indicative. However, the scale of the estimated revenue losses 
for higher tax economies as a whole (including both developed and developing ones) 
suggested by this work is truly staggering. 
Two further attempts by the IMF (2014) and EPRS (2015) at estimating losses from profit 
shifting use the efficiency of corporate income tax across countries. The efficiency of tax 
collection is a measure of the ratio of actual tax collected to the amount that should be 
collected given the corporate tax rate and the tax base. The IMF study found this efficiency 
declined with increases in the corporate tax rate, which can be attributed to profit shifting. 
The EPRS study which concentrates on the EU points to the fact that a cost-effective 
regulatory enforcement could significantly improve CIT efficiency and lessen profit shifting. 
Cobham and Jansky point out that CIT efficiency could also be capturing differences in 
compliance standards and enforcement across jurisdictions so that these studies are useful 
as indicative studies. 
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A different type of empirical investigation has been attempted by Tørsløv et al. (2017). They 
use a Cobb Douglas production function to argue that the ratio of corporate profits to 
employee compensation should be constant across jurisdictions. The assumptions behind 
the Cobb Douglas are fairly unrealistic but the model provides a benchmark for comparing 
declared profits with employee compensation across countries. By comparing reported 
ratios across countries they find that tax havens report abnormally high profits relative to 
employee compensation. The second part of their work uses the fact that tax havens have 
very high trade surpluses compared to their gross national income (which is a better 
measure than GDP as incomes from profit shifting are excluded). They assume that 
profitability in tax havens that is above the world average is due to profit shifting. They then 
use Eurostat, BEA and WTO data on trade in services and allocate the above average profits 
(due to shifting) across countries based on which countries import capital and pay interest to 
tax havens. This is in line with the fact that technology and communication MNCs often 
locate intangible assets in low tax jurisdictions (such as Skype customers paying into Skype 
Luxembourg despite not being based there). They conclude that 45% of multinationals' 
profits are artificially shifted to tax havens, i.e. more than 600 billion euro in 2015. They also 
estimate global corporate tax revenue loss at around 200 billion euro per year (around 12% 
of global corporate tax revenue) and the countries benefiting from this the most are Ireland 
and Luxembourg. 
These results show a wide range of estimates based on different assumptions and tools. The 
arithmetic estimates comparing profits declared in low tax versus high tax jurisdictions 
provide some indication of orders of magnitude, but clearly there may be many other 
reasons for these differences that are difficult to adjust for. The illicit part of the flow is 
estimated using assumptions about the ‘expected’ declaration of profits but this is 
problematic. Using Cobb-Douglas assumptions are particularly unrealistic because the 
elasticity assumptions are not necessarily universally valid. Similarly, simple methods of 
allocating expected profits across jurisdictions based on measures of activity or sales are 
problematic as we discuss later. In reality, with somewhat different assumptions we could 
expect to see different allocations of MNC profits across jurisdictions, making it difficult to 
achieve a wide consensus around particular measures of direct calculations of IFFs due to 
profit shifting.  
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6. Taxation, IFFs and developing 
countries 
A UNECA report published in 2018 affirms that policies on tracking IFFs need to be context-
specific as they need to take into account variables like socio-economic circumstances and 
levels of development, among others. While highlighting the problem with base erosion and 
profit shifting by MNCs, the report also acknowledges the role played by African residents 
who have shifted resources abroad via tax havens to developed countries (UNECA 2018). In 
Africa the problem of tax evasion and profit shifting can be associated with both MNCs and 
residents and a true estimation of IFF and its sources can only be identified when taxation is 
broken up into taxes that should have been paid by MNCs and by high net worth nationals. 
Here the types of profit shifting indicators discussed above may not be adequate for locating 
the IFFs relevant for measuring the loss of tax revenues, which is what policy in African 
countries needs to identify. An indicator on the lines formulated by Turkewitz et al. (2018) 
that uses a composite of measures looking at the risk of different types tax avoidance and 
evasion could prove to be more effective. Turkewitz et al. focus on a legal definition of IFFs, 
but their measurement approach could be usefully adapted to the types of flows that the 
legitimacy definition would identify. The disaggregated approach to indirectly identify the 
likelihood of different types of IFFs that these authors suggest is more likely to pick up both 
tax avoidance by MNCs but also violations by local companies which do not have operations 
in other jurisdictions but are taking money out through hundi/hawala or other means. 
However, this requires a more detailed understanding of the drivers of different types of 
IFFs and identifying the risk factors that could estimate the hidden flow. We do not have this 
yet, but the approach outlined by Turkewitz et al. has the potential of taking us there.  
In many low-income countries, illicit flows driven by nationals may be as important or even 
more important as those organized by MNCs. Focusing only on the latter generates 
significant false negatives for the IFFs linked to domestic companies. Anecdotal evidence 
collected just before the legislative primaries in Nigeria in 2018 or the 2018 elections in 
Bangladesh suggests that local political developments can play an important role in the 
outflow of illicit funds. Uncertainties about election outcomes can lead to capital flight by 
those who face a risk if there is an election defeat for the ruling party. In Nigeria, there is 
some evidence to suggest that dollars become scarce in the run-up to elections as 
candidates buy hard currency for use during these primaries. Much of these hard currency 
transactions then flow abroad through different mechanisms.  
The Nigerian example also shows that while MNCs clearly engage in tax avoidance, policies 
can have a rapid effect on recovering some of the taxes lost through transfer mispricing. For 
instance, tax collection improved in Nigeria when Nigerian tax authorities began to re-
examine commercial arrangements between Nigerian and Ghanaian firms. Though there is 
no ongoing formal cooperation between the tax authorities of the two countries, this is an 
example of how bilateral cooperation can achieve quick results in Africa. MNCs based in 
developed countries are also facing increased oversight in their home jurisdictions to curtail 
their most egregious transfer pricing operations. However, the legislative loopholes are also 
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becoming more complex. For instance, the legal framing of how MNCs (and local companies) 
had to pay penalties for gas flaring in Nigeria allowed them to get away with paying lower 
taxes for several decades. The Tax Appeal Tribunal had ruled that charges for gas flaring 
were fees and not penalties. MNCs with their high legal capabilities then claimed that 
because the law required paying a ‘fee’ rather than a ‘penalty’ for flaring, the money could 
come from their operating costs rather than profits. Paying out of operating costs meant 
that the tax incidence could be reduced. However, the Federal High Court overturned the 
judgement of the Tribunal and an appeal is now currently before the Court of Appeal. This 
example shows how the law is evolving in response to implicit claims of illegitimate flows 
and suggests why a purely legal definition of IFFs will not only result in false negatives, but 
also deprive campaigners of the tools for arguing for changes in the law to reduce IFFs. The 
Nigerian government has only recently amended the legal phrasing of flaring-related charges 
to describe them as ‘penalties’ in order to collect more taxes based on profits. 
The illicit flows arising from tax avoidance are therefore complex. As long as options for tax 
arbitrage remain, curbing tax avoidance will prove to be difficult. However, the 
disappearance of profits into tax havens is widely perceived to be illegitimate and is one of 
the parts of the base erosion which should be most possible to construct a broad consensus 
around. However, even here, attempts by some countries to clamp down on these 
jurisdictions will be met with resistance. Many developed country economies are also losers, 
and while the developmental consequences might not seem large when compared to 
developing economies, tax related IFFs affect both developing and developed countries.  
SDG indicators for IFFs related to tax evasion and avoidance are therefore arguably 
necessary and should be included in the list of IFFs. However, to be credible, the indicators 
identified have to be designed carefully to minimize false positives. The indicators discussed 
above suggest that there are two broad approaches to estimate the relevant IFFs. One 
approach is to use clever strategies of estimating the IFF using available data, for instance by 
looking at the proportionate declaration of profits across jurisdictions relative to some 
expectation of what they should be. This gives a dollar measure of IFFs but is open to 
potentially significant criticisms of the assumptions behind the expectation calculation. In 
particular, the assertion that profits should be proportional to employment and sales across 
countries can be easily challenged on the basis of economic theory. The productivity of 
workers varies greatly across jurisdictions, as do infrastructure, political risk and other 
factors that can ensure that the profitability of an MNC will not be proportionate to the 
employment and sales of its affiliates across countries. What is more, countries with adverse 
conditions may want to use differential tax rates to attract investment. For these reasons, 
the simplistic assumption that looking at the ratio between profits and some combination of 
sales, employment or other activity indicators will tell us something about illicit profit 
shifting may be implausible. Nor can this measure be meaningfully applied to companies 
that do not have affiliates across countries, such as most domestic companies, and yet 
significant IFFs can be driven by domestic companies.  
A more credible alternative, we believe, is to develop the risk factor approach that is 
outlined by Turkewitz et al. for measuring IFFs, which they rightly argue are latent variables 
that cannot be directly observed or measured. We would first need to agree about the most 
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relevant components of tax-related IFFs and then identify variables that could plausibly 
predict the probable magnitude of these flows. This is a feasible analytical exercise, but one 
that is outside the remit of this paper. What we can conclude on the basis of our review of 
methods is that dollar-based estimates have potentially serious problems in terms of 
assumptions, and can be criticized for significantly overestimating or underestimating the 
relevant IFFs. This in turn can make the measures unsuitable for policy. Tracking changes in 
risk factors is likely to be a more plausible strategy for policy even if it does not directly 
measure IFFs.  
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7. Trade misinvoicing, corruption and 
the limits to productive development 
This section looks at trade-related IFFs, in particular we focus on various forms of trade 
misinvoicing and how they are linked to transfer pricing (discussed above) and corruption 
processes. Trade misinvoicing includes practices whereby customs information is 
deliberately misreported or manipulated to achieve different objectives such as transfer 
pricing, bypassing import duties or export bans, smuggling, dumping, and so on. The 
misreporting or manipulation of the information can depend on the ‘nature’ of the good, the 
‘value’ of the traded good, and the ‘quantity’ of the traded goods, as well as different 
permutation of these three dimensions (e.g. underreporting of both the value and the 
quantity of the goods). When these forms of misreporting and manipulation happen we 
have a form of ‘technical smuggling’, whereas when goods are not reported at all we have 
‘pure smuggling’. 
Trade misinvoicing can lead to both situations of over-invoicing and under-invoicing, 
depending on the objectives of the participants involved in the IFF. Over-invoicing is a way to 
take advantage of export subsidies, or reducing the declared import of certain goods by 
over-invoicing others, or transferring capital out of a country by importing goods of lower 
value than declared, or even of no value in some cases. Under-invoicing, on the other hand, 
allows traders to bypass export bans or quantity restrictions, and reduce the payment of 
custom duties on imports (Nitsch 2017).  
Finally, trade misinvoicing can happen at different stages of the trading chain – e.g. country 
of origin or country of destination – and result from individual as well as collusive practices 
between traders (importers and exporters) or corrupt practices involving traders and one or 
more custom authorities. In cases of re-exporting and trade transit the players involved in 
trade misinvoicing can be located in several countries. 
The first estimations of the global scale of IFFs (Baker 2005) revealed how more than USD 
539 billion flows out of developing countries, and that trade-related IFFs represent the 
largest share of this outflow (Baker 2005). Building on this seminal work, in 2015 Global 
Financial Integrity (GFI) estimated that outflows from developing countries due to trade 
misinvoicing alone accounts for USD 800 billion and that a few commodities were 
responsible for this massive outflow of resources, especially in Africa (GFI 2015; HLP 2015). 
In the last IFF estimations from GFI (Spanjers and Salomon 2017), trade misinvoicing is 
responsible for two thirds of the total IFFs, which for developing countries alone amounts to 
something between USD 600 and 900 billion. 
Countries at early stages of industrialisation are ‘structurally vulnerable’ to trade-related 
IFFs. The reason for this is that the tradable sector is very small and mainly composed of 
mineral resources or agricultural commodities. The underdevelopment of the manufacturing 
sector, both in terms of scale and price competitiveness, creates strong incentives for trade 
misreporting and smuggling. Traders can make significant margins out of imported 
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commodities if they can bypass import duty barriers erected to protect nascent and infant 
industries. While the lack of capabilities at the level of customs authorities make developing 
countries particularly vulnerable to trade-related IFFs, there is also a more structural 
dynamic leading to trade misinvoicing. This is the fact that, in some cases, large margins 
arising from IFFs are also recycled into policy money through patron-client networks. The 
structural link between the trade-related IFFs and corruption is thus a complex one as it 
involves multiple sets of incentives at the interface of the trade activities chain and the 
political settlement in the country (Andreoni and Tasciotti 2019). 
The first attempts to capture the scale of trade-related IFFs have been mainly centred 
around country level bilateral trade data – so called ‘mirror trade statistics’ – alongside (and 
sometimes in combination with) ‘residual measures’ of capital flight based on BoP. These 
residual measures are calculated as the difference between recorded inflows and recorded 
uses of foreign exchange (Ndikumana and Boyce 2010). Country-level mirror trade statistics 
are built around anomalies in bilateral trade, that is, the existence of gaps between the 
declared values of total exports from one country and imports from another. In some cases 
(e.g. Ndikumana and Boyce 2010; Spanjers and Salomon 2017), this mirroring of bilateral 
import and export activities is adjusted so that when a gap exists between a developed and a 
developing country, we assume there is an illicit financial flow and that the developing 
country would misinvoice at the same rate with other developing countries (so called 
‘bilateral advanced economy calculation’). For those developing countries for which bilateral 
data are not available, world trade benchmarks are constructed building on country level 
data. 
The use of mirror trade statistics at the country level was pioneered by GFI and refined over 
time by several studies (see Cobham and Jansky 2017 for a review). Since then this 
methodology has raised several concerns and criticisms, despite attempts to improve it. 
There are two main sets of criticisms. The first is related to the level of aggregation of the 
analysis and the indicators used. Country-level mirror statistics tend to be quite conservative 
– that is, they capture only a limited amount of trade misinvoicing, for example they cannot 
pick up collusion between imports and exporters to misreport consistently at both ends. 
Moreover, they balance out critical differences across commodities which might be in some 
cases over-invoiced and, in others, under-invoiced. Paradoxically countries with high average 
trade value gaps might have lower trade-related IFFs than countries with lower gaps, simply 
as a result of the distribution of over and under reporting commodities (problems of 
benchmarking and false negatives). The second set of critical arguments is related to the 
first, and points more explicitly to the fact that trade mirror statistics can conflate legitimate 
and illegitimate flows (false positives) and that assumptions made around some countries 
being more or less prone to trade misinvoicing is arbitrary. These assumptions are required 
given the limited quality of the data for developing countries, although they cannot solve the 
fundamental data problem, its existence and comparability across countries. Finally, while 
the trade mirror statistics methods allow for the estimation of several IFFs - such as tax 
losses - the latter are all based on an aggregate figure and there are limited opportunities for 
policy actionability. In fact, building on country-level mirror trade statistics only, government 
policies to tackle IFFs might run the risk of being largely misguided. 
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The aggregation problem in country-level mirror trade statistics approaches has been 
increasingly addressed by shifting from analyses based on IMF’s DOTS data towards 
commodity-specific analyses based on UN Comtrade data. The latter represents the most 
disaggregated dataset for global analysis of international trade and allows for the application 
of trade mirror statistics as well as ‘abnormal prices estimates’ at the commodity level. 
Commodities are defined in the Harmonised System categorisation at up to the six-eight 
digit level. 
The application of trade mirror statistics to specific commodities allows for the identification 
of those products for which the trade gap between exporters and importers is larger (see for 
example the UNCTAD study by Ndikumana 2016). Thus, it allows us to avoid compensability 
problems associated with indicators relying on standard linear aggregation and reduce the 
risk of false positives and negatives. Moreover, for each commodity, by matching the 
estimation of trade misinvoicing with the specific taxes and duties associated with each 
commodity, it is possible to derive commodity details analysis of tax losses.  
Finally, by developing international price benchmarks for each traded commodity, it is 
possible to assess the normality or extremeness of trade prices. The benchmarks are 
normally constructed by using unit value methods, that is, by dividing the total value of the 
traded commodity by its quantity (generally in weight or unit, depending on the nature of 
the product and how they are reported in UN Comtrade). The pioneering work in ‘abnormal 
prices methods’ is associated with the contribution by Pak and Zdanowicz (1994) and later 
contributions. This method relies on the fundamental assumption that in international trade 
the price of commodities should be relatively similar given the trade disciplining effect, and 
therefore that abnormal price differences are in fact signals of misinvoicing. This disciplining 
effect is particularly significant for commodity trade as it is a low margin and high volume 
business (Forstater 2018b). 
The use of trade mirror statistics and abnormal prices methods has led to a series of country 
reports and studies on trade-related IFFs and more detailed estimations of import under-
invoicing. Some of these studies have also linked the international trade data to revenue 
authority data in countries, where these data were available. For example, the report by GFI 
for South Africa (GFI 2018) shows how, for the period 2010-2014, revenues lost to the South 
African government due to trade misinvoicing losses were in excess of USD 7.4 billion 
annually, totalling USD 37 billion over five years. The analysis by commodities and trading 
partners also allows us to discern significant heterogeneity in trade misinvoicing. For 
example, the report found that goods categories with a preponderance of under-invoicing 
tend to be associated with higher effective tax rates than other classes of imports. 
Moreover, when country partners are selected, the value of some imports from one country 
are priced below the respective group medians (China and India), while in other cases above 
(Nigeria). 
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Table 1: Trade Misinvoicing and Potential Revenue Losses in South Africa 
(millions of U.S. dollars, average 2010-2014) 
 USD, Millions 
Average Import Value Analyzed 92,052 
Import Under-Invoicing 16,308 
Average VAT%, lost revenue 2,110 
Average customs duty%, lost revenue 596 
Import Over-Invoicing 9,833 
Average company income tax%, lost revenue 2,134 
Average Export Value Analyzed 88,145 
Export Under-Invoicing 11,598 
Average company income tax%, lost revenue 2,517 
Average royalties, lost revenue 116 
Export Over-Invoicing 8,584 
Potential Revenue Losses 7,473 
Notes: Only gaps with advanced economies (excluding Hong Kong} are considered. 
Due to irregularities, gaps for commodity codes falling under HS 2-digit headers 77, 98, 99, and portions of 71 are excluded. 
"." indicates unavailable data 
Sources:  
UN Comtrade: Trade data. 
WITS: Tariff data. 
SAAS: VAT rate and exemptions/zero-rated goods, royalty collections by commodity for calculating effective rate (inclusive of 5% 
unpolished diamond export tariff). 
PWC/World Bank 'Paying Taxes' 2017: profit tax rate. 
Source: GFI, 2018:4 
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Table 2: Selected Characteristics of South African Imports (millions of U.S. dollars) 
  Reported by SARS Filtered by GFI 
Value Value Price categories (percent of total filteredvalue) 
Low (p<median) Very low 
(p<0[0.25)) 
High 
(p≥median) 
Very high 
(p≥Q[0.75]) 
Total (2010-2015) $578,853,611,802 $494,266,002,006 58.9 24.4 41.1 15.0 
2010 $82,959,746,250 $71,547,223,590 60.1 24.4 39.9 13.7 
2011 $102,705,913,523 $87,814,470,305 58.0 23.8 42.0 15.6 
2012 $104,148,113,167 $89,054,906,692 58.2 22.8 41.8 16.4 
2013 $103,436,689,928 $88,218,409,548 58.6 25.9 41.4 14.3 
2014 $99,890,452,671 $84,421,698,359 57.8 23.6 42.2 15.2 
2015 $85,712,696,263 $73,209,293,512 61.1 26.5 38.9 14.2 
By Commodity (top ten, 2-digit classification) 
Mineral fuels $118,817,545,690 $102,684,582,313 53.2 17.2 46.8 14.7 
Machinery $83,139,100,686 $67,090,322,931 50.0 18.6 50.0 20.0 
Electrical machinery $57,029,813,852 $47,417,282,036 60.1 32.5 39.9 14.2 
Vehicles $50,050,344,892 $45,527,127,332 43.3 15.5 56.7 29.5 
Plastics $14,473,825,089 $12,390,571,338 75.2 37.4 24.8 5.8 
Optical , medical products $13,870,455,841 $11,499,423,734 46.7 19.9 53.3 22.3 
Pharmaceuticals $13,160,966,551 $12,314,583,452 52.3 24.8 47.7 21.1 
Organic chemicals $9,936,071,970 $8,427,222,367 73.4 38.3 26.6 7.0 
Chemical products, misc. $9,378,409,305 $8,782,795,925 57.4 27.1 42.6 19.1 
Rubber $8,111,489,220 $6,972,177,769 52.0 23.1 48.0 19.3 
By Partner Country        
Advanced countries  $267,557,167,319 $232,465,202,855 50.5 15.5 49.5 19.7 
Developing countries  $302,034,922,159 $261,800,569,446 66.4 32.4 33.6 10.8 
Top ten countries:       
China $87,453,450,081 $75,449,950,883 82.4 52.1 17.6 4.5 
Germany $60,307,051,256 $54,767,963,881 51.4 11.5 48.6 20.2 
USA $40,530,109,954 $34,729,246,170 42.0 12.5 58.0 27.1 
Saudi Arabia $33,422,769,671 $27,952,993,542 52.7 14.8 47.3 7.3 
India $25,608,861,622 $23,035,195,280 79.3 41.6 20.7 4.4 
Japan $24,585,411,879 $23,156,788,123 57.2 13.8 42.8 14.0 
Nigeria $20,830,223,717 $19,659,380,813 33.0 7.9 67.0 31.5 
United Kingdom $20,047,945,682 $17,835,477,876 46.8 16.5 53.2 18.3 
Italy $14,839,111,124 $12,584,729,801 53.0 20.8 47.0 15.0 
France $14,117,835,747 $12,252,742,918 46.7 12.5 53.3 20.6 
Sources: GFI calculations based on data provided by the South African Revenue Service (SAAS). Note that the SAASreported data in the top 
panel (by year) includes unclassified and unknown categories of imports that are not included in the commodity and country detail below 
or the filtered estimates. 
Source: GFI, 2018:10 
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The abnormal price methods have raised several concerns, both in terms of how the normal 
price matrix is constructed and price thresholds are defined, but also with respect to the 
possibility of several false negatives and positives. First, despite the granularity of product 
classifications, all traded products within each six-eight digit group are treated as 
homogenous. This means that price differences due to quality or product functionalities are 
lost. The volatility of commodity prices during the periods under consideration is another 
factor of concern. Moreover, trade misinvoicing (more precisely mispricing in this case) will 
be flagged by the abnormal price methods only when prices diverge significantly and when 
trade misinvoicing is happening through misreporting of prices and not volume measured in 
weight. Finally, in many cases, many products are classified as “others” or are misclassified 
when they reach the custom authority. In some cases, further digit classifications are applied 
which are not comparable across countries. As pointed out by Chalendar et al. (2017), the 
abnormal prices methods can be in fact used as a tool to study product misclassification and 
potential custom fraud. 
Many of the limitations of trade mirror statistics and abnormal prices methods can be 
revealed by more context specific analysis of commodities and countries. For example, 
Fortstater (2018b:16) points out how “by looking at individual commodities it is possible to 
see that price volatility, transit and merchanting trade, and the use of bonded warehouses 
can result in large trade data discrepancies arising from legitimate trade. In particular 
ordinary, legitimate trade can generate systematic discrepancies in trade data involving 
three countries”. Country-specific and commodity specific studies are able to correct for 
potential false positives or negatives by allowing a better interpretation of the trade data 
and unpacking the underlying types of trade misinvoicing. In many cases, only at this level of 
analysis and with the support of “transaction-based” trade data it is possible to disentangle 
the IFFs–corruption nexus.  
Research under the SOAS-ACE consortium in Tanzania has attempted to adopt the different 
sets of methods reviewed in this section, including frontier methods based on transaction-
based data, to understand smuggling of two key commodities, rice and sugar (Andreoni and 
Tasciotti 2019; Andreoni et al. 2019). The country-level and commodity-level data show how 
trade misinvoicing is a major issue for Tanzania, in particular for these selected commodities. 
Moreover, it points out how trade misinvoicing is a cyclical phenomenon aligned with the 
policy cycle. In the pre-election period, trade mirror statistics at the country and commodity 
level shows a significant increase in under-invoicing, that is, an increasing gap between what 
is reported by country export data and data recorded in the Tanzanian custom authority. On 
the other hand, in the post-election period, the over-invoicing phenomenon is more 
common. This cyclicality points to the fact that trade misinvoicing is linked to changes in 
trade policy regimes, especially the introduction of special import licences or export bans in 
critical political phases. These data also show the sensitivity of the trade misinvoicing 
indicator to customs product classification. For example, taking sugar as an example, for the 
same commodity depending on the type of sugar reported there might be opposite trend 
patterns. 
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Figure 3: Smuggling in Tanzania, with a focus on sugar and rice 
Commodity-level mirror statistics: Rice 
 
Country-level mirror statistic: Cyclicality 
 
Commodity-level mirror statistics: Sugar 
 
Mirror statistics for different sugar types 
 
Source: Andreoni and Tasciotti, 2019 
These trade-related IFFs indicators are important pointers and red flags, however they say 
little about the complex flows and processes involved in trade misinvoicing in Tanzania. The 
country-specific and value chain-specific analysis of these commodities reveal some of the 
complexities associated with IFFs for just two commodities (Andreoni et al. 2019). For 
example, the analysis of technical and pure smuggling is not simply a country-level issue. 
There are at least three smuggling channels responsible for trade misinvoicing, related to 
direct, indirect and commodity trade transit. 
The value chain analysis reveals the existence of a 
tension between players involved in trade 
misinvoicing and domestic producers of the same 
commodities. It also shows how domestic 
businesses are involved in these practices as much 
as MNCs, and that the trade misinvoicing practices 
have a negative impact on key development 
outcomes, in particular productive sector 
development and employment generation. Finally, 
the use of transaction-based trade data shows the 
concentration of trade misinvoicing among a few 
major importers, and points to critical links 
between corruption and IFFs. 
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8. Towards a multi-level indicator 
system for IFFs 
Our analysis of the theory and measurement of IFFs has highlighted a number of definitional 
issues as well as the pros and cons of several methodological approaches for measuring a 
number of important types of IFFs. We have not attempted to do an exhaustive survey of all 
IFF indicators, because our point is to show that even when picking indicators on which 
considerable work has been done, there are significant differences in assumptions and values 
that are generated. It is unlikely that we will achieve consensus on a particular method of 
measurement given that all the available measures have significant false positive and/or false 
negative issues. We have addressed three sets of IFFs that are themselves closely related, 
namely tax-related IFFs, capital flow-related IFFs and trade-related IFFs. Crime-related IFFs 
such as drug trafficking were not included in the analysis. Particular emphasis was given to the 
importance of avoiding false positive and false negatives in the measurement of IFFs, and to 
examine whether indicators were grounded in sound theory. Without such grounding, the 
analysis of the development outcomes of IFFs and the consideration of different types of IFFs 
becomes difficult and can lead to misleading policy recommendations. 
From a definitional and analytical point of view we have also identified a set of 
interdependencies between different types of IFFs and corruption processes, with the latter 
understood as a structural factor characterising countries at early to mid-stages of 
development. By showing parallels between IFFs and corruption research, we have shown 
how corruption is an orthogonal process, that is, it permeates all forms of IFFs and it does so 
in different ways for different sectors of the economy.  
From a measurement perspective, we have advanced three criteria which should be met in 
the development of IFFs indicators. It is worth restating them at this stage: 
a)  It must be possible to estimate the indicator using available statistics and techniques, or 
using feasible extensions of existing statistics; and 
b)  It must be possible to target the indicator using feasible policies to reduce what the 
indicator measures; and 
c)  The indicator must be precise enough in its measurement of damaging flows so that if 
policies succeed in reducing the value of the indicator, the result will be an improvement 
in development outcomes or at least development prospects. 
The consideration of these measurement criteria against the complex processes underlying 
IFFs points to the fact that it is highly unlikely that it will be feasible to rely on a single 
indicator. It is therefore crucial to develop a battery of different indicators for different 
levels of aggregation and complement them with targeted qualitative analyses. The latter 
includes rents and process analysis; sectoral value chain analysis; country specific political 
economy analysis and so on. The selection of indicators and heuristics recognises how 
different measurement tools can play a different role. For example, a few aggregate 
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indicators can be used to flag broader global patterns, while more sector/commodity/ 
business specific ones can, in some cases, identify critical IFFs precisely enough (without too 
many false positives and negatives) to be important tools for policy. Similarly, while 
measurement exercises involving price, profit or tax benchmarks are potentially useful as 
pointers of potential IFFs, further control indicators must be introduced to increase the 
robustness of the analysis.  
The suggestion of developing a multi-level system of indicators stems from acknowledging 
the impossibility of capturing and reducing a complex phenomenon like IFFs into one single 
proxy/indicator. From a methodological point of view, it also suggests the need to move 
from the aggregate to the micro-specific phenomena – as generally done in the literature so 
far – as well as from the micro-specific to the meso- and macro-level analysis. This means 
being open to the idea of testing different combinations of IFF indicators for different 
countries (or groups of countries with similar economic structures) and selecting on these 
bases alternative ways of capturing IFFs (see Figure 4 below). As pointed out by Turkewitz et 
al. (2018:7) “The pattern of IFFs that exist in any jurisdiction will be shaped by the incentives 
of economic actors to send and receive illicit financial flows and the capacity and willingness 
of governments to prevent and stop illicit financial flows”.  
Figure 4: Schematic for a multi-level system of indicators for IFFs 
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Source: Authors 
The adoption of such an approach does not preclude the possibility of creating a composite 
index for IFFs benchmarking and monitoring goals. The transparency of such a composite 
index, however, will depend on the extent to which it is possible to go down to the different 
component IFFs (maintaining modularity) and that appropriate aggregation criteria are 
adopted (avoiding compensability). A composite index, however, should not be used as a 
policy tool as the risk of multiple and cumulated errors is indeed extremely high. 
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Politically actionable indicators will have to be sector or commodity specific and will have to 
be supported by an analysis of risk factors, as well as the economic and social consequences 
of IFFs. These are critical steps in the creation of a more developmental approach to IFFs 
(Turkewitz et al. 2018). While many of these types of indicators are still in development and 
many of them will have to be piloted across countries to prove their effectiveness, a number 
of efforts at the frontier of IFFs research are opening new avenues for populating the multi-
level system of indicators advanced here. 
In the context of trade misinvoicing (see Section 7), despite the limited country coverage so 
far, the use of transaction-based bilateral trade data is allowing us to address a number of 
major limitations of trade mirror statistics. Indeed, the possibility of matching specific 
transactions in both the export and import country allows us to bypass some of the 
aggregation problems discussed above and conduct abnormal prices analysis more 
effectively. The availability of transaction-based trade data, even for one individual country, 
can also play an important role in the analysis of the link between IFFs and corruption, as 
discussed in Andreoni and Tasciotti (2019). However, a number of challenges remain. The 
transaction-based trade data are still the result of a process of coding allocation which is 
vulnerable to corruption. Collusion between buyers and sellers in coordinating invoices is a 
further challenge. Cases of collusion in trade misinvoicing can remain under the radar, and 
trade misinvoicing for prohibited goods may be covered under unsuspected transactions. 
The empirical findings presented in Section 5 suggest that a measure of IFFs relevant for the 
SDGs could well include an indicator for misaligned profits to track illicit flows. One 
suggestion is to use ‘the value of profits reported by multinationals in countries for which 
there is no proportionate economic activity of MNCs’ as an indicator of IFFs. Economic 
activity is calculated as the simple average of single indicators of production (the share of 
full-time equivalent employees in a jurisdiction) and consumption (final sales within each 
jurisdiction) (Cobham and Jansky 2017). This is a good starting point but opens up a number 
of questions. Differences in productivity, infrastructure and political risk, amongst other 
factors, can result in differences in profitability despite similar employment and sales. Many 
firms produce for exports where final sales are abroad, and the productivity of workers can 
vary in ways that are not compensated by wages so that profits per employee could be 
expected to be different across sectors and countries. Looking at the proportionate profits 
declared across jurisdictions without accounting for all the possible economic reasons for 
these differences would give a false measure of IFFs, and accounting for all these differences 
is not easy. The other critical point that should not be missed is that low taxes can be a 
policy choice by countries to attract investment, particularly in developing countries that 
have adverse infrastructure and other conditions. Tax incentives are often used as part of 
industrial policy to control for initially adverse investment conditions in many developing 
countries. While it is possible to criticize the use of tax incentives as industrial policy given 
the potential revenue losses, the policy is nevertheless widely used in developing countries 
where concern with the SDG IFF targets is also potentially the greatest. Failing to account for 
these problems would result in false positives for IFFs being identified, even using the 
illegitimacy definition of IFFs.   
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Another possible indicator is the undeclared offshore assets indicator defined as ‘the excess 
of the value of citizens’ assets declared by participating jurisdictions under the Common 
Reporting Standards (CRS, devised by the OECD), over the value declared by citizens 
themselves for tax purposes’ (Cobham and Jansky 2017). The limitation of this measure is 
that offshore assets may also be parked in developing countries or in jurisdictions that 
adhere less to rule of law and the assets reported according to CRS in these jurisdictions may 
be less credible or entirely absent (Khan 2018). This indicator also suffers from an 
endogeneity problem due to the possible collusion between economic agents (private 
actors/citizens involved in asset shifting) and the political agents who are meant to legislate 
and enforce, making it likely that laws will  not be enacted or partially enforced in many 
cases (Turkewitz, et al. 2018: 53). In this case, adherence to the reporting requirements of 
the CRS may therefore vary significantly across countries, making the identification of IFFs 
across countries on this basis problematic. A less critical shortfall of the indicator would be 
the difficulty of keeping pace with technological innovations in asset classes for instance in 
derivatives contracts and similar exotic instruments, given that much innovation goes on in 
transferring undeclared assets across countries.  
A third, risk-based indicator being suggested is based on the fact that illicit flows are hidden 
and therefore increased opacity in transactions point to illicit transactions (Cobham and 
Jansky 2017). This involves creating a measure of partner opacity where bilateral 
transactions (for partner jurisdictions) through FDI, commodity trade and portfolio 
investments, are interrogated to identify opaque dealings. The next step is to identify ‘scale’ 
or ‘the importance of a given bilateral stock or flow in relation to the GDP of the country of 
concern’ (Cobham and Jansky 2017). Multiplying this with partner opacity would give an 
indicator for ‘exposure’. This is in line with some of the thinking emerging on IFFs in the 
World Bank and IMF (Turkewitz, et al. 2018). Some of the data required is already available, 
including the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey and data mapper that 
specifically tracks capital flows in developing economies1. An indicator of this type is likely to 
be feasible and indicate the likelihood of IFFs of interest. However Turketwitz et al. (2018: 
30) correctly argue that the methodology of identifying exposure or ‘observable 
characteristics’ that has an empirical link with IFFs, while seeming to be an empirical 
prediction problem, suffers from the inconsistency that IFFs are rarely observable (as the 
rationale for the indicator also acknowledges) and therefore researchers have to assume a 
relationship between the combination of characteristics and IFFs without necessarily being 
able to test it. This makes the indicator somewhat obscure but it is arguably more credible 
than the other two indicators discussed above in terms of analytical robustness.  
Turkewitz et al. (2018: 62) therefore argue that IFFs should be treated as a latent variable 
that cannot be directly observed. This approach recognizes the lack of robust data on IFFs 
(which are by their nature typically hidden and subject to much noise) and the fact that 
apart from the sort of data where measurement errors are bound to be large, there is very 
little data available on IFFs. They define the current measures to be more in the line of 
 
1
 http://data.imf.org/?sk=B981B4E3-4E58-467E-9B90-9DE0C3367363 and 
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/Portfl@CF/SPR_LIDC. 
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‘surface level manifestations of a latent propensity towards IFFs’. We believe there is much 
of merit in this line of thinking as it can address the measurement errors that bedevil 
existing approaches. They also distinguish between inflows and outflows, which the current 
IFF SDG indicators under consideration do not. Inflows and outflows of IFFs follow different 
processes and have separate proximate causes. For instance, a company might choose to 
invest in a certain country because of lower taxes but may also be engaged in organizing 
profit withdrawal subsequently using transfer pricing. A risk-based approach may be more 
suited to picking up both tendencies, whereas direct measures may cancel these IFFs out.  
The challenge going forward is therefore to first agree on a broad definition of IFFs (and we 
suggest our second, ‘illegitimacy’ definition comes closest to the concerns motivating global 
discussions of IFFs), and second to agree on the most important components that constitute 
policy-relevant IFFs (and we have suggested that most of the components discussed in the 
literature have some merit). The most challenging task is to develop meaningful indicators 
for each of these flows that do not have significant false positive and false negative 
problems, and which satisfy the three policy-relevance conditions that we suggested. Here 
much work needs to be done, but our review of estimates of dollar flows shows that each of 
these approaches have significant problems and depend on very significant theoretical or 
empirical assumptions that are rarely satisfactorily plausible. We argued that some early 
exploratory work on a risk-based approach to measuring IFFs is promising, though much 
work needs to be done to make this approach robust enough to achieve a broad consensus 
for each of the major types of IFFs of concern. 
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